



THE POWER OF AN ADMINISTRATOR WITH THE
WILL ANNEXED OVER HIS TESTATOR'S REAL
ESTATE.
IN many of the states of the Union, there are statutes granting
powers to and imposing duties upon administrators cum testamento
annexo, with regard to the care and disposition of the real estate
of the testator. Wliile this power and authority is purely statutory
in its character, still there are certain general features that prevail
in most all of these statutes, so that it is a subject that is of more
than local importance. There is no collection or statement of the
decisions of the different courts construing and applying these stat-
utes, so far as this writer knows. It is the purpose of this article
to present a few points on this matter.
§ 1. Authority of Executors and Administrators at Common Law
over Decedent's -ealty.-At common law an administrator took
no interest in the real estate of the decedent, nor did an executor,
unless by force of the provisions of his testator's will. An admin-
istrator is merely the agent or trustee of the estate of the decedent,
acting immediately under the direction of the law prescribing his
duties, regulating his conduct, and limiting his power: Gollamore
v. Wilder, 19 Kans. 67, 78; s. c. 17 Am. L. R. (N. S.) 135. He has
no authority over the realty of the intestate except to sell in pursu-
ance of an order of sale properly issued by a court of competent
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jurisdiction. Having no general authority, he must strictly com-
ply with the law: Broadwater v. Bichards, 4 Mont. 80, 84.
An executor and administrator at common law, after the grant-
ing of letters of administration, had essentially the same powers:
Wins. on Exr's 610. But these powers pertaining to the respective
offices, only extended to the personal estate. So, it has been
held, that an administrator as such cannot maintain a bill in equity
to remove a cloud from the title to realty: Smith v. MfcConnell, 17
Ill. 135. Nor is he authorized, in the ordinary course of adminis-
tration, to lease the real estate of his intestate : 'Terry v. Pergu-
son, 8 Port. 500. Neither can an executor, as such, sell the lands
of his testator, unless directed to do so by his will: Lippincott's
E,'r v. Lippincott's Ex'r, 4 0. E. Green 121; s. c. 8 Am. L. Reg.
(N. S.) 127. Nor can executors make a dedication of their testator's
realty, for the purposes of a street, in the absence of authority con-
ferred by the will, or an order and decree authorizing such dispo-
sition of the testator's realty given by a court of competent
jurisdiction: Kaim v. Harty, 73 Mo. 316. So where an execu-
trix brought an action for an alleged trespass upon her testator's
land, the same was dismissed, the court saying "the real estate of
a deceased person descends, upon his death, to his heirs or passes
to the devisees under his will." By the common law, the personal
representative, whether executor or administrator, takes no interest
in it: Aubuchon v. Lory, 23 Mo. 99. And to the same point,
generally, see Leavens v. Butler, 8 Port. 389; Chighizola v. Le
Baron's Ex'r, 21 Ala. 410 ; 1 Williams on Ex'rs 650, n. (D 1),
and 1 Perry on Trusts, 3d ed. § 262.
§ 2. Authority of Administrators, c. t. a., at Common Law, over
Decedent's Bealty.-An administrator c. t. a. is a person appointed
by the court to administer the testator's estate, in cases where he
has appointed no executor, or where the appointment fails : Wil-
liams on Ex'rs 461. While it is true, generally, that an adminis-
trator c. t. a. succeeded to all the powers and rights, and was
charged with all the duties which by the testator's will were imposed
upon an executor, still, as already shown, an executor, virtute offleii,
took no interest in, or power or authority over his testator's realty,
unless he was vested with it by the language of the will. Therefore,
at common law, the administrator c. t. a. only succeeded to that
power and authority, and was only charged with those duties which
pertained to the office of an executor, as such, and affected only
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the control and disposition of the personal estate of the testator.
So, "where testator directed his lands to be sold by his executors,
this was a personal trust; and as the executors renounced, there
was no one by whom the duty could be fulfilled. A sale by admin-
istrators c. t. a. was altogether unauthorized and void: 1te.Donald
v. King, Coxe 432. So, in Pennsylvania prior to the act of March
12th 1800, it was held that, "where there is a naked power to
sell and they'renounce, administrators c. t. a. have not, either at
common law or by statute, authority to sell, although the object
of the sale be the payment of debts: " Moodyv. Fandyke, 4 Binn.
31 ; Al$oody's Lessee v. Fulmer, 3 Grant 17. So, in an action of
ejectment, wherein the plaintiff claimed title through a deed from
an administrator c. t. a., it not appearing to the court whether the
devise of the testator to his executor was a mere naked power or
one coupled with an interest, it was held that the plaintiff could
not recover, the court saying, "the powers of an administrator with
the will annexed are the same as those which pertain to an exec-
utor as such;" and that, "an executor virtute offlcii at conmon
law had no right to take possession of the lands of his testator.
If they are devised they pass to the devisee, who may enter upon
and take possession; if undevised they descend to the heirs, who
are entitled to the possession :" Lucas v. Doe ex d. Pice, 4 Ala.
679, 682. Nor can an administrator c. t. a. recover the possession
of premises from a tenant thereof, who is holding over after the
expiration of his term : Floyd, Admr., v. Hterring, 64 N. C. 409.
And where a bill in equity was filed to remove a cloud from title
to realty caused by the deed of an administrator c. t. a., the court
dismissed the bill, holding, that the complainants had an adequate
remedy at law, since the deed was void on its face: Posey v. Oona-
way, 10 Ala. 811. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
commenting on the powers of an administrator de honis non with
the will annexed, who had been appointed under the Statutes of
Maryland, the statutes being silent as to his powers, said: "By the
common law his duties are confined to the personal estate unadmin-
istered by his predecessor. Whatever iuthority he may possess as
to the real estate must be derived from the will. If not found
there in express terms, or by necessary implication, it has no exist-
ence; hence the test in all such cases is the intention of the testa-
tor. Many of the duties enjoined upon the executors (by the will
in question) were foreign to those which come within the scope of
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their ordinary functions. Such powers never pass by devolution to
an administrator, unless it be clear that it was the intention of the
testator that he should become the donee of the power, in place of
the executor appointed by the will. If no provision is made by'
the will for such substitution, the power does not become extin-
guished, but the case falls within the category of those where a
court of equity will not permit a trust to fail for want of a trustee,
but will appoint one and clothe him with the authority adequate to
the duties to be discharged :" .Zngqe v. Jones, 9 Wall. 486, 498;
See also, 2 Perry on Trusts, § 500, n. 1, and 1 Williams on Ex'rs
654, n. (W"); Brush v. Young, 4 Dutch. 237; Atty.-Gen. v.
Garrison, 101 Mass. 223; Lockwood v. Stradley, 1 Del. Ch. 298;
Besley's Estate, 18 Wis. 451; Abell v. Rowe, 48 Vt. 403.
§ 3. Survivorship of Brecutorial Authority at Oommon Law-
Statute of 21 Hfenry 8, c. 4.-At common law when executors were
vested with the authority to dispose of their testator's real
estate, the death, failure, inability .or refusal of one or more,
less than the whole of their number, to act, wholly defeated the
valid execution of the authority. To avoid the great embarrass-
ment caused by this rule, the statute of 21 Henry 8, c. 4, was
passed. This act in substance provided, that where lands were
devised to be sold by executors, that those, although less than the
whole number named in the will, who took upon themselves the
administration of the will, should be competent to make as valid
bargains and sales of the real estate devised to be sold as if all the
executors named had joined. For the full text of this statute,
see Important English Statutes 19. This statute, or some modi-
fied form of it, has been adopted in most of the states of this
country.
The rules of law laid down as to the execution of this authority
of the executors are somewhat complex, and are hardly capable of
formulation into inflexible rules. This arises from the application
of the rule which, in each particular case, gives effect to the lawful
intent of the testator as shown by the construction and .interpreta-
tion of his will. The executor's authority over the testator's real
estate is divided into two classes, viz. : I. A naked power; and, 2. A
power coupled with an interest or a trust: Powell on Devises 292.
Mr. Powell seems to make two exceptions under the head of naked
powers on the question of the-survival of the power: they are:
1st, where the authority is given by the testator, to his executors,
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as executors; and 2d, where authority is given by the testator, but
there is no appointment by express words what person shall sell
the land ; for which reason the law implies that they shall do it,
who have power to pay the debts or distribute the money, viz.: the
executors. In such case the executors take in their official capa-
city, and as the office never dies the authority survives: Powell on
Devises 294, 298-9. At common law a purely naked power did
not survive. So it is said of the act of 21 Henry 8, c. 4, the
question has been, whether this statute extended to executors where
a power to sell was given to them nominatim; and all the authori-
ties agree, that if a power is given, indicating personal confidence,
it must be confined to the individuals to whom it is given, and will
not, except by express words, pass to others than the trustees
originally named, though they may by legal transmission, sustain:
the same character. So it was decided in Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves
27, and in many other cases; Tainter v. Clark, 13 Met. 220, 226 "
Powell on Devises 294; 1 Sugd. on Powers *146-4.
A naked power is discretionary with the donee, and no court can
compel or control the execution thereof, although he leave it un-
executed ; but the rule is different in the case of a power coupled
with an interest or a trust. In such case a court of equity will
not allow it to fail for want of a trustee: Perry on Trusts, § 248.
It is apprehended that this doctrine of the court of equity just
stated was the foundation of the passage of the statute of 21 Henry
8, c. 4; Brown v. Armistead, 6 Rand. 594, 598 ; Mosby's Adm'r
v. Mosby's Adm'r, 9 Gratt. 584.
§ 4. Reason for, and construction of Statutes which vest Execu-
torial Authority over -Decedent's Realty, in Administrators c. t. a.-
The rule that a trust shall not fail for want of a trustee, which is
thought to be the foundation of the statute of 21 Henry 8, c. 4, is
also the foundation of the statutes of the several states of the Union,
which provide for the exercise of the same power as the executors,
over their testator's real estate, by the administrators with the will
annexed: Brown v. Armistead, 6 Rand. 594, 598; Mosby's Adm'r
v. Mosby's Adm'r. 9 Gratt. 584, 598; Evans v. Blackiston, 66
Mo. 437, 439. It was said by Lord CoxE, of the statute of 21
Henry 8, c. 4, "Albeit, the letter of the law extendeth only to
where executors have a power to sell, yet being a beneficial law it
is, by construction, extended to where lands are devised to execu-
tors to be sold:'? cited in corlies v. Little, 14 N. J. L. 373, 3834.
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And in this country that statute, or the substitutes therefor, are
liberally construed : Taylor v. Morris, 1 N. Y. 341, 359; McDow-
ell v. Gray, 29 Penn. St. 211. It is therefore held that the laws
giving to the administrator with the will annexed the same powers
as the executors is a remedial statute, and accordingly is to be
liberally construed: Drayton v. Grimke, I Bailey Ch. *392; so,
where the express provisions of the law did not authorize the
administrator c. t. a. to act in cases where thetestator named no exe-
cutor of his will, it was held that the case was within the reason of
the law, and that the administrator c. t. a. might lawfully exercise
a power of sale conferred by the will, though no executor was named
therein: Hester v. Hester, 2 Ired. Eq. 330, 3839; and where the
statute authorized the administrator e. t. a. to act, if none of the
executors qualified, or if having qualified they should die before
sale and conveyance, it was held that he Was authorized to act
under the statute where only one of the executors died, and the
remaining one had been removed from his office before the sale:
Mosby's Adm'r v. Mosby's Adm'r, 9 Gratt. 584, 598.
§ 5. The Character and Classification of such Statutes.-The
character of the statutory provisions of those states of the Union,
so far as the writer has been able to examine them, which vest the
executorial power over real estate in the administrator c. t. a., may
be divided into three classes : 1st. Those states where words expressly
descriptive of realty are used by the lawgivers in giving the
authority to the administrators c. t. a.; 2d. Those states where no
words descriptive of realty are used, but a necessary implication
arises from effectuating other sections of the statute which clearly
refer to the exercise of executorial authority by the administrator
e. t. a. over the testator's realty ; 3d. Those states where the law
provides, that the same authority shall vest in the administrator c.
t. a. as was reposed in the executor, but there is no reference to
the exercise of any authority over realty, either expressly, as in
the first class, or by implication, as in the second class. The first
class includes the following states: Alabama: Rev. Code, § 1609;
California: Probate Act, §§ 48 & 178; Colorado: GenI. L. 1877,
§ 2882; Missouri: Wag. St. 93, sec. 1 ; New Jersey: Nix. Dig.
258, § 20 ; North Carolina: R. S. Ch. 46, sec. 34; Ohio: 2 Rev.
St. (S. & W.) 1629, sec. 1; Pennsylvania: Purdon's Dig. 283,
§ 69; Rhode Island: Rev. St. Ch. 156, sec. 27; South Carolina;
Tennessee: Code, sec. 2240 ; and Virginia. The state of Kentucky
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is now included in the first class, but prior to a recent enactment
it was the only state in the second class. The third class includes
the states of Connecticut: Gen. Sts., p. 371, sec. 12; New York
and Wisconsin: Rev. Sts. 1858, ch. 98, see. 11. The power or
authority which the administrators with the will annexed may exer-
cise over their testator's real estate depends almost entirely on the
intention expressed in the will of the testator. If no authority is
given by the will to the executor, none can pass to the administra-
tor c. t. a.: Montague v. Garneal, 1 A. K. Marsh. 351 ; Ashburn
v. Ashburn, 16 Ga. 213.
§ 6. Character and Classification of Executorial Authority over
Testator's Bealty.-To determine to what extent the administrator
e. t. a. may exercise the powers vested in the executor is a matter
of no little difficulty; but it is thought that most of the cases can
be reconciled. The executor "may in some instances be seised of
real estate of the deceased as trustee, or be ex officio invested with
the power of disposing of it:" 1 Williams on Ex'rs 654. SHAW,
C. J., says, "the distinction seems to be between cases where the
testator gives special directions to his executor as executor, or con-
fers on him as such particular powers and trusts, and cases where the
testator, having appointed one or more persons as executors, creates
the same persons trustees, or gives the residue to them upon trusts
specified. In the latter case the law presumes that he reposes
special trust and confidence in the persons of the executors, by name
or otherwise, and does not rely upon their official duty as executors.
In the former it is an enlargement of the office of executor :"
Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray 341, 359. The meaning of the
phrase, "in the former it is an enlargement of the office of executor,"
in the foregoing quotation, is, at first blush, a little perplexing. But
when we remember that the learned judge was discussing the power
of an executor over real estate under common and statute law, it
becomes clear that he meant, by "enlargement of the office of exe-
cutor," an extension of executorial power to the testator's real
estate as an additional matter of administration, an authority not
existing at common law in the administration and settlement of
estates. From this it is apparent that the power of the executor
over his testator's real estate may be divided into two classes, viz. :
1. Cases where the will vests him with the power personally, as a
trustee; 2. Cases where the will annexes to the office of executor
particular powers and trusts ; these powers and trusts are only such
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as belong to such an office, in the ordinary course of adminigtration
and settlement of estates ; if they are an enlargement of the office
and extend beyond the ordinary course of administration the
authority must be placed under the first class.
§ 7. Character and Construction of Statutory Authority of Ad-
ministrators c. t. a. over Decedent's Bealty.-This same classifica-
tion of the executorial power is found in the construction of the
statutes of states which vest that power in the administrators with
the will annexed. In all those cases falling within the first class of
executorial power above named, where the execut6r is vested with
authority, as a trustee, it is held that the administrator c. t. a. can-
not exercise the power.
So, where the will created a trust fund, appointing E. G. to act as
trustee, and in the subsequent part of the will named the same E.
G. executor of the will; on the death of E. G. and the issuance
of letters of administration de bonis non c. t. a., the court said :
"the trust, though created by the will, is not-thereby vested in the
executrix, qua executrix or ratione officii, but given to her nomi-
natim. And as the trust, therefore, is not connected by the words
of the will, nor yet by any of the provisions or operation of law,
with the executorship, the trust and executorship are to be viewed
as if they were vested in two distinct and different persons by the
words of the will," and the administrators d. b. n. e. t. a. were held
not to be entitled to the possession of the trust fund: -Ebert's
Appeal, 9 Watts 300, 302. So, where the testator devised unto
his executors, "all and singular the rest and residue of" his "estate,
real and personal, upon the trusts, and for the purposes hereinafter
named," then declared the trusts, giving to the survivor or survivors
of the trustees power to sell and convey his realty. The executors
having renounced, letters of administration c. t. a. were issued, and
a sale of land so devised was made by the administrators c. t. a.
In an action of ejectment, the court, in deciding that the deed of
the administrators c. t. a. was void, said, "by force of the act of
the 24th of February 1834, relating to executors and administrators,
he (the administrator c. t. a.) may execute a power to sell in order
to bring the land into a course of administration, but not to execute
a trust for a collateral purpose. * * * For purposes purely administra-
tive, the thirteenth and fourteenth sections give the devise of a power
the effect of a devise of the title, and the sixty-seventh section puts
an administrator with the will annexed on a footing with a surviving
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executor, but not on a footing with a testamentary trustee." Again,
"now the object of the statute was to make lands legal assets in
all cases, and when a trust is created to bring it into a course of
administration, it is proper that an administrator should succeed to
the execution of it; but the statute was not intended for a trust
unconnected with an executor's ordinaiy duties :" Ross v. Barclay,
18 Penn. St. 179; Belcher v. Branch, 11 R. I. 226, 229; Brush
v. Young, 28 N. J. L. 237; -Pratt v. Stewart, 49 Conn. 339;
Anderson v. McGowan, 42 Ala. 285; Tarver v. Haines, 55 Id.
503, 509; H1arrison v. Henderson, 7 Heisk. 315, 348-9.
The authority over the testator's real estate vested by the will
in the executor, to which the administrator c. t. a. succeeds, is
included in the second class, into which the executorial power was
above divided, to wit : That authority which is annexed to, or con-
stitutes the duties pertaining to the executorial office in the ordi-
nary course of the administration and the settlement of estates.
"It was considered by the legislature that he who had the execu-
tion of the will in regard to the personal estate, should have it also
in regard to the real, in the absence of any direction in the will to
the contrary, and would be a fit person for the purpose, whether
nominated executor by the will or appointed administrator with the
will annexed by the court of probate :" Mosby's Adm'r v. Mosby's
Adm'r, 9 Gratt. 598. The effect of the adoption of those laws
which are similar to the provisions of 21 Henry 8, c. 4, and the
statutes vesting executorial power in the administrators c. t. a. is
thus stated by the Supreme Court of Alabama: " This statute
obliterates the common-law distinction, as to survivorship and capa-
bility of execution, between a devise of lands to executors with
directions to sell and a naked power of sale. Under its operation
each is capable of execution by the surviving or acting executor ;"
and this power is extended, "to an administrator with the will
annexed who would not otherwise have succeeded to it:" Tarver
v. taines, 55 Ala. 503, 507. "As a general rule the powers of
the executor are co-extensive with the trusts created by the will.
And while he is engaged in administering any and all the trusts
created by the will, it must be presumed that he is acting in the
capacity of executor alone, unless it plainly appears that such was
not the intention; although the duties be such as are unusual in
the course of ordinary administration : "Mathews v. Meek, 23 Ohio
St. 272. And, "all the provisions of a will should be executed by
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the administrator with the will annexed unless a contrary intention
clearly appears :" Pratt v. Stewart, 49 Conn. 339, 341.
§ 8. Illustrations showing when Authority vested in Executor may
be exercised by Administrator c. t. a.-In the following cases the
authority given by the will was held to pertain to the office of the
executor, and therefore capable of execution by the administrator
with the will annexed. A contest on final settlement of account
of administrators a. t. a;, under a will which provided that "it is
my will that the shares of property which may be allotted to my
children, shall be sold by my exeoutor," and ' that my executor
shall lend out the money which may arise from said sale belonging
to my children." The administrators c. t. a. sold the real estate,
receiving confederate money; the heirs objected to the allowance
of the money received on such sales in the account, but the objec-
tion was overruled: Anderson's Adm'r v. McGowan, 45 Ala. 462;
overruling same case, 42 Ala. 280. Action to recover proceeds of
sale made under will, which "directed executor to sell real estate
in one year after testator's death, and devised avails so that his
daughter should receive one-fourth thereof:" Pratt v. Stewart, 49
Conn. 399. Action to enjoin sale of real estate under will which
provided, "executor will within one year after my decease, sell at
public auction (stating terms) all the real estate I shall own at the
time of my decease; from the proceeds of sale pay expenses of
sickness, funeral and all my just debts ;" then apply proceeds to
a number of specific trusts and payment of legacies: JHidwell v.
Brummagim, 32 Cal. 436 ; Jackson v. Jeffries, 1 A. K. Marsh.
88; Peebles v. Watts, 9 Dana 102. By recent statute in Ken-
tacky, it seems that an administrator can exercise a power of sale,
although it was only discretionary with the executor. Action to re-
cover remainder of purchase-money on a sale made by administrator
under a will "directing it to be sold by executor at ' the death of
testator's widow,' to the highest bidder at public auction : Gulley v.
Prather's Adm'r, 7 Bush 167; s. P. Shields v. Smith, 8 Id. 601.
Action of ejectment against purchaser from administrator, who sold
under a will which provided "all of the real estate, except that be-
queathed to my wife, I direct and empower my said executor to
have divided into seven equal parts, as nearly as may be, leaving
such roads as he may deem necessary, &c., and sell the same at such
time and on such terms as he may think fit, hereby empowering him
to convey all my right, &c., to purchasers, and the proceeds of said
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sale to be distibuted in equal parts among my seven children :"
Dilworth v. Rice, 48 Mo. 124. Ejeetment by trustee of heirs,
against purchaser from administrator c. t. a. under will, providing,
"I will unto my friend C., as trustee, all my real estate for the fol-
lowing purposes, to be divided into lots by him, and sold by him at
his discretion ; proceeds I direct shall be invested in purchasing con-
venient lot, and erecting dwelling thereon, to be by him taken in
name of my sister B. for her life, remainder to her three children,
and to be equally divided between them at her death :" Evans v.
Blackiston, 66 Mo. 437. A bill to set aside a sale made to himself
by administrator, under a will providing that "a moiety of real
estate" be devised "to my daughter F. for life, on her death to her
husband V. for life, and on his death to his children by said
daughter in fee; and when said lands should belong to said chil-
dren, surviving executor or executors might make sale of real estate
to make an equal division among said children, unless they (chil-
dren) could all agree upon a division;" part of children were under
age at time of sale by administrator c. t. a. : howell v. Sebring, 1
Mcart. Ch. 84. Where testator bequeathed and devised the
whole of his lands and personal estate to his wife for her life, and
after her death, the whole to be sold, "and the money arising from
the sale to be equally divided between my sons and daughters :"
Smith v. iicCrary, 3 Ired. Eq. 204. Where will bequeathed to
executors, in trust, $10,000 to be put at interest by them for six
years, then to be appropriated by "the executors," to the objects
of the trust, the surviving executor having partly executed trust,
and paid money to contractor to apply as directed by will, taking
a bond for faithful performance of contract, and then resigned; the
administrator c. t. a. was held to succeed to the management of
trust, and as entitled to sue on contractor's bond for breach thereof:
Mathews v. Aleek, 23 Ohio St. 272. Will provided, "I desire and
hereby direct my executors, or the survivor of them, to sell and
convert into money, as soon as the same can be done on good terms
and without sacrifice, all of my property, both real and personal,"
(specifying te'rms in the discretion of executors), "and to pay the
money thus acquired into the hands of the trustee hereinafter
named: .Elstner v. Fife, 32 Ohio St. 358. In disposing of the re-
sponsibility of bondsmen, it was said by the court, "by the act of "
12th March 1800, he (administrator c. t. a.) has the same powers
and authorities as were conferred on the executor. If he has the
700 POWER OF ADMINISTRATOR WITH WILL ANNEXED
power to sell, the administrator d. b. n. (c. t. a.) has the same
power and authority: Commonwealth v. -Forney, 8 W. & S. 35.3,
856; Meredith's Estate, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. C. 433. Testator's will
devised his realty to wife for her life, with power to dispose of the
residue after payment of 'specific legacies; by her will she directed
her executors to sell her house and lot, same having been acquired
under her husband's will; held, "the executors were not made testa-
mentary trustees of the property ; they were directed to sell for
distribution; their duties were official by virtue of their office.
When they renounced, their duties and powers aevolved upon the
administrator with the will annexed: Keefer v. Schwartz, 47 Penn.
St. 503. Where will vested in executors discretionary power as to
time, manner and terms of sale of his realty, the proceeds to be
distributed among testator's heirs: Evans v. Chew, 71 Penn. St.
47; affirming s. c. 8 Phila. 103. Will devised house and lot to wifo
for life, directing if she "should desire, and my executors deem it
for the best interests of my wife and children that it should be sold,
they may sell the same ;" it afterwards provided for the distribution
of the residue among the heirs, according to laws of the Common-
wealth: Lantz v. Boyer, 81 Penn. St. 325. Will gave power to
executors "to sell and convey real estate in such manner as they
shall think proper, either at public or private sale," and "to receive
the purchase-money and give acquittances for the same," also direct-
ed them "to pay or transfer the one equal half part to his son,"
and to other legatees: Jackman v. Delafield, 85 Penn. St. 381.
Will directed that all just debts be paid, charged real estate with
payment of legacies and annuities, expressly authorized executrix
to sell real estate for payment of debts, also gave general authority
to sell, and requested that no bond, or only nominal bond, be re-
quired of executrix; wife made executrix; sale by the adminis-
trator c. t. a. to pay debts and legacies: Bailey v. Brown, 9 R.
I. 79; vide also Probate Ct. v. Hazard, 13 R. I. 3. Will directing
executor to sell and convey for payment of testator's debts : Dray
ton v. arimkce, Bailey Ch. 392. Will "directed that the crops
made on his lands should be used to pay his debts, with power to
his executors, if necessary, or "if they think best to sell a part or
any portion of his lands given to R. :" -Dougherty v. Crawford, 14
S. 0. 628 (notes of unreported cases). Will provided that "all
lands be sold by executor, and the proceeds, after payment of debts,
funeral expenses, costs and expenses of executing will, and pro-
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viding for pecuniary bequests, be divided among children and sub-
ject to certain specific trusts :" Harrison v. .Henderson, 7 Heisk.
315. Will devised land to testator's widow, during life or widow-
hood, upon her death or marriage land to be sold on certain terms
"and the money to be equally divided among children;" also
directed payment of his debts: Green v. Davidson, 4 Bax. 488.
Will provided "that the executor should sell the land assigned to
testator's widow as dower, and divided the proceeds among certain
of his children :" Blakemore v. Kimmons, 8 Bax. 470. Will
provided that "the land should be sold for the best price that
could be got, which was directed by a power of attorney to H.,
of the same date," and the proceeds divided among his four
sisters: Broadus v. 1?osson, 3 Leigh 12. Will provided "that ex-
ecutors sell at public sale all my land, provided the said land will
sell for as much, in their judgment, as will be equal to its valtie,
and the money be placed in the hands of A. :" Brown v. Armi-
stead, 6 Rand. 594. Will provided "that executors, whenever they
should think best, should sell his land in B. ; that the money aris-
ing therefrom, after payment of all just demands against estate,"
and making provision for certain legacies, "shall be equally divided
between B., M. and J. :" Mosby's Adm'r v. Mosby's Adm'r, 9
Gratt. 584.
§ 9. illustrations showing when Authority vested in .Eecutor,
can not be .Exercised by Administrator c. t. a.-In the following
cases the authority conferred by the will was held to be vested in
the executor as a trustee, and therefore not capable of being exer-
cised by the administrator c. t. a.
The will vested the executors with discretionary power as to
selling the real estate of the testator, for the purpose of dividing
his estate among his heirs; but, by a codicil, gave to his wife all
of his personal estate ; the court held that the effect of the codicil
was to make the power of the executors, in effect a power to parti-
tionrealty; the court also went on to decide, that, admitting the power
of sale was annexed to the office of executor, it did not pass to the
administrator c. t. a. under their statute: Dominick v. .Michael,
4 Sandf. 374. (It seems to the writer that the decision of this
point was not necessary to the determination of the case, and the
subsequent decisions of the courts of that state regard as it- as
obiter.) The same point was considered in the case of Conklin v.
Egerton, 21 Wend. -430, where the same view of the statute was
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taken ; but, on the final decision of this case by the court of last
resort, this point was expressly left undetermined : 25 Wend. 224.
In the meantime, a case was decided in which the contrary view was
taken, incidentally, however, to wit: That where the authority per-
tained to the office of executor, under the statute, "in such cases the
administrator with the will annexed is probably entitled to execute
all the trusts of the will, in the same manner as if he had been
named therein, by the testator as the executor and trustee: " De
Peyster v. Clendining, 8 Paige Oh. 295, 310.
The cases of Dominick v. Michael, and Conklin v. -Egerton,
are cited by the Court of Appeals of New York in the following
cases: Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298, 303; Roome v. Philips,
27 Id. 357, 363; Bain v. Matteson, 54 Id. 663; Dunning
v. Ocean National Bank, 61 Id. 497.
The view expressed in De Peyster v. Clendining, supra, was
adopted in Bain v. Mattison, supra, but the question does not seem
to have come squarely before the court of last resort, until the
decision of the case of Mott v. A ckermann, 92 N. Y. 539. In
this case, the will provided "on the death of my sister Maria,
or'as soon afterwards as they may think advisable, taking into view
the condition of the country, and the probable increase in the value
of the property, and within three years from the proof of this will,
I authorize, empower and direct them (executors) to convert into
money all my real and personal estate, which conversion shall be
treated in law as if it had happened at the time of my sister's
decease." It also devised and bequeathed to her sister Maria, for
life, certain real and personal estate, after her death to U., subject
to the payment of legacies specified. The suit was an action for
specific performance of contract of sale made by an executor, who,
during the proceedings died, thus making it necessary to decide
whether the administrator c. t. a., in whose name the suit was
revived, could execute a deed to the premises, or a trustee should
be appointed to execute the deed. The court said, "we have no
doubt, therefore, that where a power of sale is given to executors
for the purpose of paying debts and legacies, or either, and espe-
cially where there is an equitable conversion of land into money for
the purpose of such payment and for distribution, and the power of
sale is imperative and does not grow out of a personal discretion
confided to the individual, such power belongs to the office of exec-
utor, and under the statute passes to and may be exercised by the
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administrator with the will annexed. That is the case before us."
While this case does not in express terms overrule the cases of
Dominick v. Michael, and Conklin v. Egerton, supra, it must be
held to do so impliedly.
A testator devised all the residue "of his real and personal estate,
to his executors, upon certain trusts, viz. : To continue for two
years a partnership; to lease his real estate, and to make sale of
the same ;" a subsequent clause of the will gave a discretionary
power of sale over his real estate to his executors: Held, that the
power did not pass to the administrator c. t. a. : Boss v. Barclay,
18 Penn. St. 179. So, where the will created a trust fund,
appointing 0. as trustee: Ebert's Appeal, 9 Watts 300. Whbre the
will provided as to a particular lot, which was mortgaged to the
testator, that his executors should buy it in on sale under the mort-
gage, and might sell the same as they thought best for the interests
of his estate, the court citing, Ross v. Barclay, supra, said the
administrator c. t. a. might exercise "a power to sell in order to bring
the land into a course of administration, but not to carry out a trust
for a collateral purpose, such, for instance, as here, to turn it into
money for convenience of partition :" Waters v. Margerum, 60
Penn. St. 39. The cases of Ross v. Barclay and Waters v. Afar-
gerum, supra, especially the latter, are modified in a subsequent
decision by the same court. The case arose on a suit by the admin-
istrator c. t. a. to recover the purchase-money on a sale of testa-
tor's land, to raise a fund for division among the heirs; the will
gave discretionary power as to terms of sale to the executors, as
such, and they were to divide and distribute the estate between
testator's heirs; the court sustained the action, and held that a
power of sale to turn real estate into money for purposes of parti-
tion and distribution passed to the.administrator. A power "by
deed to divide the real estate among the children, so that each should
have an equal share of the productive and unproductive real estate,
to be left entirely to the discretion Of the executors without appeal,"
a power of partition of realty in specie, was held not to pass to the
administrato c. t. a.: lEstate of Hepburn, 8 Phila. 206. Where the
will devised rents, profits and income of real estate to his six sons,
and directed his executors "to pay all just debts and expenses out
of the property aforesaid, and to pay all taxes and repairs which are
absolutely necessary, and to divide the rents, profits and income of
the real and personal pronerty as aforesaijd," on a settlement of
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the accounts of the administrator c. t. a., it was sought to charge
him with the amount of rents received from real estate, and he
sought credit for repairs made on the real estate, but both claims
were disallowed, because it was said that the power over the realty
'did not pass, under the law, to the administrator c. t. a.: Belcher v.
Branch, 11 R. I. 226. Where the will provided, "I desire that
my executors may have full power and authority to sell or lease, or
dispose of in any. way they may think best for my estate, all my
interests in any lands, &c.," there was a number of specific trusts
in the will: Armstrong v. Park's -Devisees, 9 Hlumph. 195, 199,
206. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin follows the early decisions
of :New York state as to powers of the administrator c. t. a. : In
re estate of Besley, 18 Wis. 45 1.
§ 10. Meaning to be attached to "-Discretion " and "Personal
Trust and Coinfidene"-Miscellaneous Points.-In many of the
decisions the above words are frequently used, and in such a
manner as often to confuse the casual reader. But, by recollecting
what has been said in §§ 6 and 7, supra, the meaning of these
words will be clear. An executor is a trustee, especially in
equity; and these words are used indiscriminately by the courts in
cases where the authority under discussion is a trust, and where it
is annexed to the office. So it is that frequently the authority,
although annexed to the office of executor, as such, calls for the
exercise of just as much judgment, discretion and care as if
vested in the executor as a trustee. The authority thus vested
in the executor, virtute officii, is therefore distinguished into two
kinds, viz.: 1. Mandatory or imperative, and 2. Discretionary:
Taylor v. Morris, 1 N. Y. 341; Hke-Dowell v. Gray, 29 Penn. St.
211. This distinction, according to the most of the states, in the
absence of any express enactment providing that the administrator
c. t. a. may exercise the discretionary authority vested in the exe-
cutor, does not affect his right of succession to the authority. So,
where the will expressly required that both executors should agree
to a sale of the realty, it was held that the power could be exercised
by the administrator c. t. a. : Meredith's -Estate, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq.
Cas. 433. See also, -Evans v. Chew, 8 Phila. 103; s. o. 71 Penn.
St. 47; Brown v. Armistead, 6 Rand. 594; Bailey v. Brown, 9
R. I. 79; Probate Court v. Hazard, 13 R. I. 3. The statutes of
Alabama and Kentucky expressly provide for such cases: Gulley
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v. Prather's Adm'r, 7 Bush 167; Shields v. Smith, 8 Id. 601;
A4nderson v. MeGowan, 45 Ala. 462.
A maxim of the common law is that, "the greater contains the
less:" Broom's Legal Maxims 174. So, it is held, "a general
power to sell will be conclusively presumed to be for the payment
of debts :" Ohew v. Evans, 8 Phila. 103 ; s. c. 71 Penn. St. 47;
also for the payment of legacies: Bailey v. Brown, 9 R. I. 79.
A sale made by an administrator c. t. a., under the authority of an
act passed subsequently to the probate of the will, is valid : Blake-
more v. IKimmons, 8 Baxter 470.
As we have already seen, an administrator c. t. a. must be
appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction : § 2, supra. The
authority of any court cannot extend, beyond the territorial limits
of its soverignty, and the laws of one state cannot govern the
disposition of real estate situate in another state. It is therefore
held, that an administrator with the will annexed, duly appointed
by a court of competent jurisdiction in one state, cannot make a,0
-
valid contract of sate of his testator's real estate situate in another
state: Wills v. Cowper, 2 Ham. 124; Simpson v. Rawkins, 1
Dana 303.
When the authority is annexed to the office of the executor, a
renunciation of that office deprives him of his authority: BElstner
v. .Fife, 32 Ohio St. 358, 369. As the authority which the admin-
istrator with the will annexed succeeds to is that which is annexed
to the office of executor, his renunciation ends his authority to make
sale or conveyance of his testator's real estate : .Elstner v. Fife,
supra, 372; Owens v. Cowan's Heirs, 7 B. Mon. 152, 157.
"When the mode of executing the power is not defined, it may
be executed in any manner sufficient to convey the subject-matter,
and the power need not be referred to in the instrument executing
it :" 4 Kent's Com. 330, 333, 334; 1 Sugden on Powers 247,
404. ":Executors having a general power of sale are not restricted
to any particular mode of selling: Huger v. Huger, 9 Rich. (Ch.)
217, 221, 238; 2 Washb. R. P. 663; Christy v. .Pulliam, 17
Ill. 59, 61: Bonney v. Smith, Id. 531, 533; Bond v. Zeigler, 1
Kelley 324. So where it was contended that an administrator
c. t. a. should have sold at public sale instead of at private sale,
there being no provision in the will in regard to the matter, the
objection was not sustained: Moss v. Moorman's Adm'r, 24 Gratt.
96. 110.
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